WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD STATE OF CALIFORNIA

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POPE POWELL,

Permissibly Self-Insured,

Applicant,

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,

Defendant.

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Case No.

ADJ8710988 (Oakland District Office)

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND DECISION AFTER RECONSIDERATION

Applicant seeks reconsideration of the December 2, 2013 Findings and Award (F&A), wherein the workers' compensation administrative law judge (WCJ) found that applicant, while employed as a manager of fleet operations on September 26, 2011, sustained industrial injury to his bilateral upper extremities, including shoulders and elbows. The WCJ found that applicant's injury caused permanent disability of 62%.

Applicant contends that the WCJ erred in finding that applicant's injury caused permanent disability of 62% because this finding was based on an incorrectly assessed occupational code.

We have received a request for an extension of time to file an Answer from defendant, which we will grant, and we have reviewed defendant's Answer. The WCJ prepared a Report and Recommendation on Petition for Reconsideration (Report), recommending that the Petition for Reconsideration (Petition) be granted as to applicant's permanent disability rating and denied as to applicant's occupation code.

We have considered the Petition for Reconsideration, the Answer, and the contents of the Report, and we have reviewed the record in this matter. For the reasons discussed below, we will grant reconsideration, amend the WCJ's F&A, and return this matter to the trial level for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We will otherwise affirm the WCJ.

FACTS

While employed by defendant as the director of fleet management and operations on September 26, 2011, applicant sustained an admitted industrial injury to his right upper extremity and left shoulder.

On October 29, 2012, applicant was evaluated by Panel Qualified Medical Evaluator (PQME) Pramila R. Gupta, M.D., a neurologist. Dr. Gupta examined applicant and reviewed medical records from applicant's treating physicians as well as utilization review records. She diagnosed applicant with a right brachial plexus injury, left lateral epicondylitis, and left shoulder strain, which together resulted in a Whole Person Impairment (WPI) of 49%. (October 29, 2012 PQME Report, App. Exh. 1, p. 8.)

On January 10, 2013, a Request for Summary Rating Determination was submitted to the Disability Evaluation Unit (DEU), based on Dr. Gupta's PQME Report. The DEU issued a Consultative Rating Determination on January 24, 2013, which was calculated using a 47% WPI based on Dr. Gupta's report and the occupational group code 212, and concluded that applicant's permanent disability rating was 62%.

The parties appeared for trial on October 29, 2013 on the issues of, as relevant to the Petition before us, permanent disability and occupational group and group number. Applicant argued that his permanent disability should be rated using the occupational variant for group 112 (mostly clerical occupations), and defendant argued that applicant's permanent disability should be rated using the occupational variant for group 212 (mostly professional and medical occupations).

As the WCJ noted in her Opinion on Decision, the record does not include a job duties statement for applicant's position (Opinion on Decision, p. 5), but applicant testified on this issue as follows: Applicant held a management position with the title of Director of Fleet Management and Operations. (October 29, 2013 Minutes of Hearing and Summary of Evidence [MOH/SOE], 7:9-10, 9:7-8.) His initial salary was \$85,000.00 per year, and his salary at the time of the October 29, 2013 hearing was between \$108,000.00 and \$115,000.00. (*Id.* at 7:11-12.) He was hired to reorganize fleet management for the Public Utilities Commission (PUC), including fuel and usage. (MOH/SOE, 7:13-14.) As the Director of Fleet Management and Operations, applicant supervised five employees, and dealt with

budgets, specifications, requests for proposals relating to the purchase of vehicles such as trucks and heavy equipment, and requests for quotes. (*Id.* at 7:14-18.) He wrote contracts, policies, and procedures; he and his staff all used computers, and applicant did not have his staff perform computer tasks for him. (*Id.* at 7:18-22.) Additionally, applicant coordinated efforts between his department and other city agencies and the city attorney's office, and worked with directors and supervisors from other divisions regarding PUC policies. (*Id.* at 7:26-29.) Applicant also advised human resource managers regarding policy enforcement, and had authority to negotiate with vendors. (*Id.* at 7:31-34.)

Applicant spent 80-85% of his time working on his computer, and at least five hours a day. (MOH/SOE, 7:24-25.) The other employees in his department used their computers at least 60% of the time. (*Id.* at 8:2-3.) Applicant estimated that he dealt with more than 100 emails each day, and used his telephone two to three hours each day, in conjunction with his computer use. (*Id.* at 7:25-31.) In addition to his computer, he also used a mouse, a ten key (a tool for budgeting, reviewing requisitions for approval, and keeping track of expenditures in his division), and a calculator. (*Id.* at 8:3-7.)

When applicant was hired, his initial assignment was to bring "all fleet management and operations under one umbrella"; at the time, fleet management was separated into three departments, with one in Millbrae and the remaining two in southeast San Francisco. (MOH/SOE, 9:23-31.) In 2012, there were approximately 1,250 vehicles in the entire fleet, and applicant was responsible for their maintenance and fueling. (*Id.* at 9:31-33.) The fueling budget was approximately \$10,000,000.00. (*Id.* at 11:6-8.)

As the Director of Fleet Management and Operations, applicant administered a GPS maintenance program, writing specifications for the contract signed by the city manager. (MOH/SOE, 9:34, 10:3-4.) Applicant also helped develop an emergency response plan for natural disasters, for which he collaborated with the San Francisco Fire and Police Departments as well as the United States Department of Homeland Security. (*Id.* at 10:32-11:6.)

The WCJ issued her decision on December 2, 2013, finding that applicant's injury caused 62% permanent disability. In the accompanying Opinion on Decision, the WCJ explained that this rating was based on Dr. Gupta's PQME Report and the occupational group code 212.

Applicant timely sought reconsideration, contending that the WCJ erred regarding applicant's permanent disability rating, and arguing that the rating should have been based on the occupational variant for group 112, not 212. Applicant also contended that the WCJ erred in relying on the DEU's Consultative Rating Determination, which was calculated using a 47% WPI based on Dr. Gupta's report, because Dr. Gupta's report listed a 49% WPI, not 47%.

DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, we agree with applicant and the WCJ that the DEU's Consultative Rating Determination includes an erroneous WPI rating from Dr. Gupta's PQME Report. As the WCJ stated in her Report, "a permanent disability rating must be based on substantial evidence and petitioner is correct that 47% WPI [as] utilized by the DEU rater is inconsistent with Dr. Gupta's reporting." (Report, pp. 7-8.) Accordingly, we will amend the F&A to defer the Findings of Fact and Award with respect to permanent disability (Finding No. 5; Award (b)) and attorney's fees (Finding No. 9; Award (b); Order). We will also direct that Dr. Gupta's October 29, 2012 PQME Report be sent to the DEU for a formal rating. After the DEU issues a formal rating, it should be served on the parties, who will then have the opportunity to object to either the rating instructions and/or the formal rating, and to cross-examine the DEU rater. If neither party chooses to cross-examine the rater or requests further proceedings, the rating instructions and formal rating should be admitted into evidence without further order from the WCJ. (Blackledge v. Bank of America (2010) 75 Cal.Comp.Cases 613 (Appeals Board en banc).)

With respect to applicant's proper occupational code, we will affirm the WCJ. Labor Code section 4660(a) lists the factors for determining the applicant's percentage of permanent disability, including nature of the physical injury or disfigurement, occupation of the injured employee, and age at the time of injury, with consideration of diminished future earning capacity. (Lab. Code, § 4660(a).) The 2005 Schedule for Rating Permanent Disabilities (PDRS) sets forth the occupational groups. The PDRS describes occupational group 112 as "mostly clerical occupations," involving the "highest demand for use of keyboard [and] prolonged sitting," and lists "billing clerk, computer keyboard operator, [and] secretary" as typical occupations. (See PDRS, p. 3-29.) The PDRS describes occupational group 212 as "mostly professional and medical occupations," involving "work predominantly performed indoors, but

may require driving to locations of business; less use of hands than 211; slightly higher demands on spine than 210 & 211." (Id. at p. 3-30.)

The WCJ's summary of applicant's job duties is instructive here:

"Though [applicant] spent the majority of his work day using a key board, his integral job duties and salary were managerial in nature. Applicant had control of the entire fleet of 1000 vehicles and the fuel budget of over \$10 million for the city's PUC department. He had supervisory responsibility and authority to negotiate contracts. He implemented new programs. He advised on policy. In his capacity, preparation of contract terms, charts, and use of email undoubtedly necessitates extensive keyboarding, however, the clerical function is not at the core of his job." (Opinion on Decision, p. 6.)

We further agree with the WCJ that there is a difference between applicant's "managerial job and a clerical or data entry occupation, with the latter requiring the 'highest demand' for keyboarding." (Report, p. 6.) As the WCJ correctly states, jobs in occupational group 112 usually have workflow "controlled by a superior who typically assigns keyboarding tasks at a constant rate to ensure maximum output by the clerical employee." (*Id.* at 6-7.) By contrast, applicant's testimony that he spent 80-85% of his time reflects the transition in the modern office environment to "[c]onstant use of a personal computer." (*Id.* at p. 6; MOH/SOE, 7:24-25.) Applicant's job required the use of a computer to fulfill the managerial responsibilities inherent in the position of Director of Fleet Management and Operations, not as his core task.

We note that both applicant and the dissent have raised the "dual occupation rule," which states that, "[a]s a general rule, a worker is entitled to be rated for the occupation which carries the highest factor in the computation of permanent disability. When the worker's duties embrace the duties of two forms of occupation, the rating should be for the occupation which carries the highest percentage." (Grossmont U.H.S. Dist. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Burns) (1997) 62 Cal.Comp.Cases 687 (writ denied).) We agree with the WCJ that the dual occupation rule is not implicated here, because "occupation code 212 does in fact contemplate[] use of a computer by a professional or managerial employee," and that "the nature of computer use contemplated by occupation code 112 is in the order of the 'highest demand' for keyboarding and although [applicant] utilized a computer every day, the nature of his use was not in the 'highest demand.'" (Report, pp. 5-6.)

Accordingly, we will grant the Petition and amend the F&A to defer the Findings of Fact and Award with respect to permanent disability (Finding No. 5; Award (b)) and attorney's fees (Finding No. 9; Award (b); Order). We will otherwise affirm the F&A.

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that applicant's Petition for Reconsideration of the December 2, 2013 Findings and Award is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, as the Decision After Reconsideration of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, that the December 2, 2013 Findings and Award is AFFIRMED, EXCEPT that Findings of Fact Nos. 5 & 9, Award (b), and the Order are AMENDED as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT

- 5. The issue of permanent disability is deferred.
- 9. The issue of attorney's fees is deferred.

AWARD

- a. Temporary disability indemnity benefits for the period from February 18, 2012 through October 2, 2012, payable at the rate of \$1.066.72 per week and subject to the lien of the Employment Development Department, less credit for any sums heretofore paid on account thereof;
- b. The award of permanent disability and associated attorney's fees is deferred;
- c. Future medical treatment reasonably required to cure or relieve from the effects of the injury herein.

ORDER

IT IS ORDERED that the Order of Commutation is **DEFERRED** pending the resolution of the issue of permanent disability.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the matter is RETURNED to the trial level for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

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ALFONSO J. MORESI

I DISSENT (see attached dissenting opinion),

MARGUERITE SWEENEY, COMMISSIONER

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DATED AND FILED AT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

FEB 18 2014

SERVICE MADE ON THE ABOVE DATE ON THE PERSONS LISTED BELOW AT THEIR ADDRESSES SHOWN ON THE CURRENT OFFICIAL ADDRESS RECORD.

POPE POWELL LAW OFFICES OF ROBERT A. FURTADO CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO SAN FRANCISCO CITY ATTORNEY gel

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POWELL, Pope

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION OF COMMISSIONER SWEENEY

I concur with the majority's decision with respect to the erroneous Consultative Rating Determination provided by the DEU. However, in returning the matter to obtain an formal rating from the DEU, I would also rescind the finding of group 212 and find instead that applicant's occupational group code was 211, and direct the DEU to issue a rating accordingly.

When an applicant has job duties that include the duties of two occupational groups, the applicant is entitled to be rated on job duties producing the highest rating. (*Dalen v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 497 [37 Cal.Comp.Cases 393].) *Dalen* does not set forth any particular time requirement for time spent on job duties, and so long as the duties are an "integral" part of the applicant's duties, and not "incidental" to the position, applicant may be considered to be part of that occupational group. (*National Kinney of California v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.* (*Casillas*) (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 203 [45 Cal.Comp.Cases 122].) The determination is made as of the applicant's occupation at the time of injury.

Our jurisprudence offers numerous examples of the dual occupation rule's application. In *Dalen*, the applicant worked in both construction and demolition; at the trial level, he was classified in the occupational group of "house wrecker," which encompassed general unskilled labor, not the higher-rated occupational group of "heavy construction worker," which encompassed specific types of skilled labor. (*Dalen, supra*, 26 Cal.App.3d at 501, 504-05.) The Court of Appeal noted that this classification "refers to a worker who 'may occasionally climb stairs, ramps, or ladders,' the uncontradicted testimony reflected that petitioner spent one-third of his time working off the ground, and that his work involved climbing, sometimes with ladders and sometimes without, and as well climbing on highsided trucks used in the demolition work." (*Id.* at 504.) Moreover, the Court noted, "in placing petitioner in [the "house wrecker" group], the referee and the board arbitrarily disregarded the specific evidence and findings in relation to petitioner's occupation." (*Id.* at 506.)

Similarly, in Casillas, the applicant was employed as a tree trimmer, and argued that he should be classified in the occupational group that encompassed trimming trees at 24 feet off the ground, using a

ladder, a task that he testified he performed. (Casillas, supra, 113 Cal.App.3d 203, 213-14.) At the trial

Finally, in Grossmont Union High School District v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, the applicant was initially hired to work as an English teacher, and then was also hired as an athletic coach. (Grossmont Union High School Dist. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Burns) (1997) 62 Cal.Comp.Cases 687 (writ denied).) He performed both of those jobs coterminously. (Id. at 688.) The Court of Appeal upheld the use of the occupational group for athletes, which carries a higher factor than the occupational group for teachers for permanent disability rating, because the applicant was engaged in two forms of occupation. (Ibid.)¹

Here, it is uncontested that applicant spent 80-85% of his time working on his computer, and at least five hours a day. (MOH/SOE, 7:24-25.) Applicant estimated that he dealt with more than 100 emails each day, and used his telephone two to three hours each day, in conjunction with his computer use. (*Id.* at 7:25-31.) He wrote contracts, policies, and procedures; he and his staff all used computers, and applicant did not have his staff perform computer tasks for him. (*Id.* at 7:18-22.) In addition to his computer, he also used a mouse, a ten key (a tool for budgeting, reviewing requisitions for approval, and keeping track of expenditures in his division), and a calculator. (*Id.* at 8:3-7.) Applicant, as noted in the

POWELL, Pope

¹ See also Adams v. City of Moreno Valley (2009) 2009 Cal.Wrk.Comp.P.D.LEXIS 476 (panel decision) (upholding WCJ's decision to use higher-rated occupational classification for park superintendent, not park grounds worker, when applicant performed the duties of both positions); Carr v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Group, Inc. (2012) 2012 Cal.Wrk.Comp.P.D.LEXIS 505, *7 (panel decision) (reversing WCJ's decision to use lower-rated occupational classification for truck drivers, not loading and

unloading, because although applicant drove for six out of ten hours in a day, "the loading and unloading component of [applicant's] job was not incidental but rather a significant portion of his duties").)

Petition, "had two different sets of job duties that were both integral to his job; his managerial duties and his clerical duties." (*Id.* at 8:28-9:4.) Thus, although his position was managerial in nature, I agree that applicant "spent the majority of his time doing clerical type duties using a computer and keyboard ... [which were] also integral to his overall job in that computer and ten key were the tools he needed to use in order to carry out his functions as the director of fleet management and operations." (Petition, 8:25-28.) If his staff were to perform these clerical tasks on his behalf, they would likely be classified as clerical workers; there is no reason to find otherwise simply because applicant received a greater salary.

As in *Dalen* and *Casillas*, applicant here has provided uncontested testimony that the clerical duties and keyboarding were intrinsic to his position as director of fleet management and operations. His computer use was not "impliedly contemplated" (*Casillas, supra*, 113 Cal.App.3d at 215) by his employment; it was necessary and integral to the successful performance of the duties and responsibilities inherent in his position. He performed his clerical duties coterminously and intertwined with his managerial duties. (See *Burns, supra*, 62 Cal.Comp.Cases at 688.) Accordingly, I would apply the dual occupation rule in rating applicant's permanent disability.

Additionally, I note that the occupational variants are based on the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, which the WCJ and the majority cite for definitions of occupational group codes 112 and 212. The definitions are meant to be used as a guide, not applied rigidly. Here, I would find the description of occupational group 211 – "mostly clerical occupations; emphasis on frequent fingering, handling, and possibly some keyboard work; spine and leg demands similar to 210" – the most appropriate. I would use the occupational variant for applicant's injury under occupational group 211, as it is the higher rating. (See *Dalen, supra.*) I would issue a final rating of 16.01.02.01 – 49 – [5]62 – 211G – 65 – 67.

Finally, I would offer the following word of caution. With the increased dependence on computers and other forms of manually-operated technologies in the workplace, we will continue to see an increase in injuries of the type alleged by applicant. To ensure that injured workers receive adequate compensation for these injuries, we must take into account the dynamic and changing realities of the workplace, and, as here, consider the occupational group codes that most accurately reflect the injured worker's actual work activities.

For this reason, I would grant reconsideration and amend the F&A as to applicant's permanent disability rating.



WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

MARGUERITE SWEENEY, COMISSIONER

DATED AND FILED AT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

FEB 1 8 2014

SERVICE MADE BY MAIL ON ABOVE DATE ON THE PERSONS LISTED BELOW AT THEIR ADDRESSES AS SHOWN ON THE CURRENT OFFICIAL ADDRESS RECORD

POPE POWELL LAW OFFICES OF ROBERT A. FURTADO CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO SAN FRANCISCO CITY ATTORNEY



RB/sye

POWELL, Pope