WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD STATE OF CALIFORNIA

TIMOTHY KIRBY,

Case No. ADJ10289629 (Oakland District Office)

Applicant,

OPINION AND DECISION AFTER RECONSIDERATION

VS.

CONTRA COSTA WATER DISTRICT, permissibly self-insured, administered by YORK RISK SERVICES,

Defendants.

We granted Defendant's Petition for Reconsideration (Petition) to further study the factual and legal issues in this case. This is our Opinion and Decision After Reconsideration.

Defendant seeks reconsideration of the Findings, Award and Order (F&A) issued by the workers' compensation administrative law judge (WCJ) on November 29, 2016 wherein the WCJ found in pertinent part that applicant sustained a psychiatric injury, that the injury claim was not barred by Labor Code section 3208.3(h), that applicant was temporarily totally disabled as of March 12, 2015, and continuing, and that the EDD lien was denied.

Defendant contends that applicant did not meet his burden of proof that actual employment events were the predominant cause of his psychiatric injury; that the actions of applicant's supervisor were good faith personnel actions; that applicant was not temporarily totally disabled; that "applicant failed to mitigate his losses"; and that applicant is not entitled to receive temporary disability indemnity for the same period that he received state disability indemnity (SDI) benefits from the Employment Development Department (EDD).

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We received a Report and Recommendation on Petition for Reconsideration (Report) from the WCJ recommending the Petition be denied. We received an Answer from applicant.¹

We have considered the allegations in the Petition and the Answer and the contents of the Report. Based on our review of the record, for the reasons stated in the Report, which we adopt and incorporate, except for subsection I "Different Viewpoints," (Report, pp. 2-3.) and for the reasons discussed below, we will affirm the F&A.

BACKGROUND

Applicant claimed a psychiatric injury while employed by defendant as a crew leader during the period from March 11, 2014 through March 11, 2015. Applicant received treatment from David L. Green, Ph.D., (App. Exh. 1, David L. Green, Ph.D.) and on August 5, 2015 applicant was examined by Robert W. Poston, Ph.D., the Qualified Medical Evaluator (QME) in psychology. (App. Exh. 2, Robert W. Poston, Ph.D., August 5, 2015.)

On June 3, 2015 Dr. Green submitted a treatment note stating that "On a psychological basis" applicant could not return to "work in his department." (App. Exh. 1, p. 1.) In each of his treatment notes the doctor reiterated his opinion that applicant temporarily could not return to work in his department. (App. Exh. 1, pp. 2-10.)

After examining applicant and reviewing the medical record, Dr. Poston stated:

"Mr. Kirby's psychiatric condition is such he would be expected to have some difficulty performing in the workplace, but not to the extent he is seen as totally or partially disabled. At the same time, it is quite clear a return to work under the supervision of Mr. Kelly or Mr. Bartiz would likely have quite a deleterious effect on his psyche. A successful return to work will necessitate he work in a different setting. He is not yet seen as having reached maximum medical improvement."

(App. Exh. 2, Robert W Poston, Ph.D., September 5, 2015, pp. 17 – 18.)

¹ Defendant e-filed a Petition For Leave to File a Reply to Report and Recommendation on Petition for Reconsideration and subsequently filed the petition with the WCAB. We note that the Reply, attached to both copies of the petition, appears to have been filed incorrectly because only the first page and the last page are included and it does not actually contain the argument referred to in the petition. Thus, defendant's request is not approved and the petition and the Reply will not be considered. (see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10848.)

The parties proceeded to trial on September 9, 2016.

DISCUSSION

In his Report the WCJ commented on the testimony of the witnesses with respect to the issues of actual events of employment and good faith personnel action. (Report, pp. 3-4, pp. 14-15.)

The WCJ's findings on credibility are entitled to great weight, "because of the referee's [WCJ's] opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and weigh their statements in connection with their manner on the stand." (Garza v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 312, 319 [35 Cal.Comp.Cases 500, 505]; Nash v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1793, 59 Cal.Comp.Cases 324; Greenberg v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 792, 39 Cal.Comp.Cases 242.)

Also, a WCJ is required to prepare an opinion on decision that includes "a summary of evidence received and relied upon and the reasons or grounds upon which the determination was made." (Lab. Code, $\S5313$; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, \S 10566.) Here, in his Opinion on Decision, the WCJ discussed at length the witness testimony and he explained in detail the reasoning and rationale for his findings on the credibility of the witnesses. He explained why the testimony of the witnesses constituted evidence that actual events of employment were "75% of the causation" of applicant's psychiatric injury. (Opinion on Decision pp. 3 – 4; Report, pp. 4 – 5.) We accept the WCJ's findings on credibility and do not disturb his decision that applicant sustained injury AOE/COE and that applicant's injury claim was not barred by the good faith personnel defense.

Regarding temporary disability, when an industrial injury causes an employee to be restricted from working, either totally or partially, the employee may be entitled to receive temporary disability indemnity. (Lab. Code, §§ 4650, 4653, 4655 and 4656). The purpose of temporary disability indemnity is to provide interim wage replacement assistance to an injured worker during the period of time he or she is healing and incapable of working. The employer's obligation to pay temporary disability benefits is the result of the employee's inability to perform the tasks usually encountered in his or her employment and the wage loss resulting therefrom. (Meeks Building Center v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 219 [77 Cal.Comp.Cases 615]; Herrera v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1969) 71 Cal. 2d

254 [34 Cal.Comp.Cases 382]; Allied Compensation Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acci. Com., (1963) 211 Cal. App. 2d 821, [28 Cal.Comp.Cases 11]).

Although a temporarily partially disabled worker is expected to work while partially disabled if suitable work is available, as the Supreme Court explained:

"Under the 'odd lot' doctrine, a worker who is only partially disabled may receive temporary total disability payments if his partial disability results in a total loss of wages. (Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1959) 52 Cal.2d 417, 421 [340 P.2d 622].) This doctrine places the burden on the employer to show that work within the capabilities of the partially disabled employee is available. If the employer does not make this showing, the employee is entitled to temporary total disability benefits. (Id., at p. 422; Transport Indem. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 542, 546 [321 P.2d 21].)"

(General Foundry Service v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Board (Jackson) (1986) 42 Cal.3d 331, 339, fn. 5 [51 Cal.Comp.Cases 375].)

Here, in various treatment reports during the period from June 3, 2015 through February 29, 2016, Dr. Green, the treating physician, stated that applicant "temporarily cannot work in his department." (see App. Exh 1.) In his Report the WCJ noted that although applicant was temporarily partially disabled, defendant had not offered him any alternative employment and as such, applicant was entitled to temporary disability benefits. (see Report, p. 16.)

The WCJ's analysis with respect to this issue appears to be consistent with the statutory and case law noted above. Again, we see no reason to disturb his decision.

Finally, regarding the EDD lien, in the Minutes of Hearing the WCJ stated that the EDD paid benefits "according to their opening lien." (September 9, 2016 Minutes of Hearing (MOH), p. 3.) In the Opinion on Decision and the Report the WCJ noted that despite receiving notice of the mandatory settlement conference and the trial, the EDD did not file any exhibits nor did it appear at the trial. Our review of the trial transcript indicates that the WCJ's statements that there was no evidence submitted regarding actual payment of benefits by the EDD are accurate. We also note that at the trial defense counsel stated, "...[N]o evidence of their lien [the EDD lien] has been offered into evidence" (MOH, p.3) and as the WCJ stated "EDD has not filed a Petition for Reconsideration, so EDD evidently does not

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1	believe itself to be aggrieved." (Report, p. 17.) Thus, there is no reason to disturb the WCJ's decision	
2	dismissing the EDD lien.	
3	Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the Report and for the reasons discussed herein, we affirm	
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KIRBY, Timothy

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED as the Decision After Reconsideration of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board that the Findings, Award and Order issued by the WCJ on November 29, 2016 is AFFIRMED. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD I CONCUR, MARGUERITE SWEENEY DATED AND FILED AT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA SEP 0 7 2017 SERVICE MADE ON THE ABOVE DATE ON THE PERSONS LISTED BELOW AT THEIR ADDRESSES SHOWN ON THE CURRENT OFFICIAL ADDRESS RECORD. TIMOTHY KIRBY D' ANDRE, PETERSON, BOBUS & ROSENBERG LAW OFFICE OF MARK GEARHEART EMPLOYMENT DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT

KIRBY, Timothy

TLH/abs