A respondent in a workers’ compensation claim may not be taxed with the filing fee at the conclusion of the case unless that respondent has admitted, stipulated or acknowledged being the “employer” or is adjudged by the court as the employer.

Jane Salem

So held the Appeals Board in Steel v. TForce Freight, reversing the trial court.

In the case, the facts are straightforward. Terry Steel sought benefits for injuries he alleged resulted from his work as a truck driver. He named TForce as his employer on his petition for benefit determination. TForce denied the claim, asserting that Steel was an independent contractor and, therefore, not entitled to benefits.

Steel didn’t request a hearing within 60 days after a dispute certification notice issued, so the trial court set a show-cause hearing. Steel didn’t respond or appear for the hearing, and the court dismissed the case without prejudice. The order also taxed the $150 filing fee to TForce.

TForce asked for reconsideration, asserting that it wasn’t obligated to pay the fee because it wasn’t the employer. The judge denied the motion, and TForce appealed. The Appeals Board reversed. 

The opinion

TForce argued that Steel had the burden of proof to show an employer-employee relationship, and he failed to do so. Therefore, the proof was insufficient to conclude that TForce was the employer for purposes of the regulations governing proceedings in the trial court, including the regulation imposing filing fees on the employer. Stated differently, TForce was simply a respondent to the petition and denied it was an employer against whom the filing fee could be taxed.

The board agreed that, unless the respondent has admitted, stipulated or in some other way acknowledged its status as the employer, an injured worker has the burden of proving the employer-employee relationship. In this case, Steel filed a petition, but then he did nothing to prosecute his claim. In addition, TForce denied from the beginning that it was Steel’s employer, and he did nothing to prove that it was.

The board wrote, “[W]e find no evidence in this record supporting a finding that TForce is an ‘employer’ in the context of this case, and we, therefore, conclude there is simply no basis to find that TForce was claimant’s employer for purposes of taxing the filing fee.”

TForce additionally argued that the form pleadings required by the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation are insufficient by themselves to establish a party’s status as an employee or employer for purposes of assessing filing fees.

The board agreed again, reasoning that the forms “may not perfectly capture the substantive legal nuances of a particular claim,” even though “use of such form pleadings is required.” So, a purported employer’s response to and use of these forms, standing alone, aren’t “sufficient to establish the legal status of the parties to the litigation.”

“We know of no authority, and none has been provided to us, that contemplates a court’s assessment of fees to a party who is merely forced into the position of responding to a [petition],” the board wrote. It added that the trial court specifically noted that neither party offered proof of or the absence of an employment relationship.

The board concluded, “[I]t would be incongruous, in circumstances where there is no evidence or acknowledgment of an employer-employee relationship, to nevertheless tax costs against a party as ‘the employer.’”

It continued, “Given the fact that claimant bears the burden of proving each and every essential element of his claim, including his employment status, we conclude there is nothing in this record that provides any basis for the trial court to assess fees against TForce as an ‘employer.’”

The board modified the court’s order to reflect that no filing fee is taxed under the circumstances of this case and taxed the filing fee to neither party.

Jane Salem is a staff attorney in the Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims, Nashville. This entry is republished with permission from the court's blog.